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1. Introduction
Beyond his seminal contributions to the theory and the design of concurrent and distributed
algorithms, Leslie Lamport has throughout his career worked on methods and formalisms
for rigorously establishing the correctness of algorithms. Commenting on his first article
about a method for proving the correctness of multi-process programs [32] on the website
providing access to his collected writings [47], Lamport recalls that this interest originated
in his submitting a flawed mutual-exclusion algorithm in the early 1970s. As a trained
mathematician, Lamport is perfectly familiar with mathematical set theory, the standard
formal foundation of classical mathematics. His career in industrial research environments and
the fact that his main interest has been in algorithms, not formalisms, has certainly contributed
to his designing reasoning methods that combine pragmatism and mathematical elegance. The
methods that he designed have always been grounded in the semantics of programs and their
executions rather than being driven by the syntax in which these programs are expressed, in
contrast to many methods advocated by “pure” computer scientists.
The famous “Time/Clocks” paper [33] describes executions of distributed state machines
and introduces the happened-before or causality relation, a partial order on the events occur-
ring in runs. The “philosophically correct” way for reasoning about distributed executions
would thus appear to be based on a partial ordering between operations. Indeed, Lamport
explored this idea and proposed a method based on two relations called precedes and may
affect [34]. This method can notably be applied to algorithms that involve non-atomic opera-
tions, such as the Bakery algorithm. However, Lamport felt that the method did not scale well,
unlike assertional reasoning about global states of systems as viewed by an idealized external
observer, even if no single process can observe them. This style of reasoning considers lin-
earizations of distributed executions, and it generally requires algorithms to be described in
terms of their atomic operations (an exception being [37]). The notion of an overall system
invariant that is preserved by every operation plays a central role in this approach: such an
invariant explains why the algorithm is correct. Assertional proofs have since been demon-
strated to be completely rigorous, to be amenable to mechanized checking, and to scale well.
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Lamport realized that there are two fundamental classes of correctness properties that
arise in the verification of concurrent algorithms, for which he coined the terms safety and
liveness properties [32]. Generalizing, respectively, partial correctness and termination of
sequential programs, safety properties assert that “nothing bad ever happens”, and liveness
properties require that “something good happens eventually.” These intuitive concepts were
later formalized by Alpern and Schneider [7] who showed that any property of runs can
be expressed as the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property. Although
proofs of liveness properties generally rely on auxiliary invariants, the basic principles for
proving safety and liveness properties are different, and the two are therefore best considered
separately.
Lamport advocates describing algorithms in terms of state machines whose operations are
atomic. Invariants, and more generally safety properties, are then established by induction:
the invariant holds in all possible initial states and is preserved by every operation of the
state machine. The proof of liveness properties usually relies on associating a measure with
the states of the algorithm and showing that the measure decreases with every step as long
as the “good state” has not been reached. This argument is made formal through the use of
well-founded orderings, which do not admit infinite decreasing chains. A direct application
of that proof principle would require fixing a scheduler that governs the execution of different
processes—an undesirable requirement since one wants to establish the correctness of the
algorithm for any “reasonable” scheduler. A useful generalization requires that as long
as the target state has not been reached, no step of the algorithm increases the measure,
“helpful” steps decrease the measure, and some helpful step will eventually be executed.
In order to justify the latter (which in itself is a liveness property!), one invokes fairness
assumptions [9, 42] that assert that executable operations will not be neglected forever, fixing
the precise understanding of a “reasonable” scheduler for the particular application.
Another fundamental concept underlying the rigorous development and proof of concur-
rent algorithms advocated by Lamport is that of refinement. It allows a designer to describe the
fundamental correctness properties using a high-level (possibly centralized) state machine and
then prove that another state machine whose description is given at a lower level of abstrac-
tion faithfully implements the high-level description. For example, a high-level state machine
describing a consensus algorithm [51] could have a variable chosen holding a set of values,
initialized to the empty set, a Choose operation that assigns chosen to the singleton set {v}
for some value v among the proposed values, and Decide operations that set the decision
values of each process to that chosen value. A lower-level refinement would then describe the
actual algorithm in terms of exchanged messages and votes. A technical complication in that
approach is that the lower-level state machine will have operations that modify only low-level
variables, i.e., variables that do not exist at the higher level of abstraction. These operations
cannot be mapped to operations of the high-level state machine. For example, operations that
send messages in the putative Consensus algorithm have no meaning in the high-level specifi-
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cation. Lamport advocates that formalisms for describing executions of state machines should
be insensitive to stuttering steps that leave unchanged the state visible to the specification.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the Temporal Logic of Actions TLA and the
specification language TLA+. These are Lamport’s contributions to the formal specification
and verification of algorithms that have had the greatest impact in the academic community
and in industry, and their design was guided by the principles outlined above.
2. The Temporal Logic of Actions
Temporal logic [62] is a branch of modal logic in which the accessibility relation corresponds
to temporal succession. During the 1970s, several authors [15, 31] suggested adopting tempo-
ral logic as a basis for proving programs correct. Pnueli’s influential paper [61] provided the
insight that temporal logic is particularly useful for specifying and reasoning about reactive
systems, which include concurrent and distributed systems. A generalization of Pnueli’s logic
that is based on the “next” and “until” connectives remains the standard variant of linear-time
temporal logic used in computer science to this day.
2.1 The Genesis of TLA
In 1977, Lamport proposed a method for proving the correctness of concurrent programs [32].
It used invariant reasoning (based on Floyd’s method [22]) for establishing safety properties
and lattices of leads-to properties for proving liveness. The method relied on a fixed progress
assumption for each process in order to establish elementary leads-to properties.
Lamport was introduced to temporal logic in the late 1970s during a seminar organized
by Susan Owicki at Stanford University. At that time, the distinction between linear-time
and branching-time temporal logics was not yet clearly established in computer science.
Lamport clarified this difference [35] and showed that the expressive powers of LTL and
CTL are incomparable. He quickly realized that temporal logic was a convenient language for
expressing and reasoning about fairness and liveness properties. For example, weak and strong
fairness of executions with respect to an action α, representing an operation of a process in a
concurrent system, can be written as
2(2en(α)⇒3exec(α)) and 2(23en(α)⇒3exec(α)).
In these formulas, the predicate en(α) characterizes those states in which α is enabled (may
be executed), exec(α) is true when action α has been executed, and 2 and 3 are the “always”
and “eventually” operators of LTL. Weak fairness requires that an action cannot remain
perpetually enabled without eventually being executed. Strong fairness requires that even
an action that is infinitely often (but perhaps not perpetually) enabled must eventually be
executed. Using such formulas, more general fairness hypotheses than uniform progress of
processes considered in [32] can be expressed unambiguously. Moreover, the principles of
reasoning about leads-to lattices could be derived from the general proof rules of temporal
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logic. A joint paper with Owicki [59] develops these ideas into a full-fledged method for
proving the correctness of concurrent programs. In the introduction to this paper, the authors
write:
While we hope that logicians will find this work interesting, our goal is to define a
method that programmers will find useful.
This motto describes well Lamport’s approach to formalisms for specification and verification.
Whereas standard LTL was clearly useful for expressing fairness and liveness properties,
Lamport felt that it was not convenient for writing complete specifications of actual systems.
His intuition was confirmed when he observed colleagues at SRI struggling with specifying
a FIFO queue in Pnueli’s temporal logic. (It was later proved that this is actually impossible
unless one assumes that the input values presented to the queue were unique.) This observation
led his colleagues to introduce a more expressive temporal logic based on intervals [63]. In
contrast, Lamport concluded that the fundamental problem was the “property-oriented” style
of specifications as a list (conjunction) of properties observed at the interface of a system, such
as the inputs and outputs of the queue, but excluding any reference to internal system states.
He designed TLA as a logic geared towards specifying and reasoning about state machines,
based on a few orthogonal and simple concepts that provide a higher level of abstraction
(and elegance!) than the use of a pseudo-programming language, as in the earlier paper with
Owicki [59].
2.2 The Logic TLA
Lamport designed TLA around 1990 [38, 40]. TLA formulas are built from constants, whose
values are fixed throughout an execution, and (state) variables. We use x ,y ,z to denote
constants and u,v ,w to denote variables. A state is a mapping from variables to values. TLA
distinguishes three levels of expressions:
• The syntax of state functions and state predicates is that of standard terms and formulas
of first-order logic. Concrete examples of state predicates are v ≥ 0 or ∃x : x ∈ u∧x /∈ v .
Semantically, they are interpreted over individual states.1
• Transition functions and transition predicates, also called actions, are first-order terms
and formulas that may contain both standard (unprimed) variables u,v ,w and primed
variables u ′,v ′,w ′. Examples are u ′ ∈ v or ∃x : u ′+x = v . Semantically, transition for-
mulas are interpreted over pairs 〈s, t〉 of states, with unprimed variables being interpreted
in state s and primed variables in t .
1 We could distinguish a level of constant formulas that do not contain any variables, but we will consider such
formulas to be state formulas.
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• Temporal formulas are built from state and transition formulas by applying operators of
temporal logic according to the rules given below. They are interpreted over behaviors,
i.e., sequences σ = 〈s0,s1, . . .〉 of states.
Whereas standard LTL builds temporal formulas solely from state formulas, the introduc-
tion of transition formulas as a primitive building block is fundamental to specifying state
machines. For example, the LTL equivalent to the TLA action u ′ ∈ v would be
∃x : x ∈ v ∧ c(u = x )
where cdenotes LTL’s next-time operator. Rather than using a pseudo-programming notation
as in [59], actions are just first-order formulas over primed and unprimed variables. One
reasons about them using ordinary mathematical logic, rather than special principles for
reasoning about programs. At the temporal level, any formula can be considered as a system
specification or as a property. There is no formal distinction between the two, and reasoning
about them relies on the same fundamental principles of temporal logic.
TLA introduces several notations at the levels of state and transition formulas. Given a state
formula e , the transition formula e ′ is obtained by replacing all (free) occurrences of state
variables by their primed counterparts. Semantically, e ′ denotes the value of e at the second
state of the pair of states at which e ′ is evaluated. The action UNCHANGED e is shorthand for
e ′ = e . For an action A and a state formula e , the actions [A]e and 〈A〉e stand for A∨ e ′ = e
and A∧e ′ 6= e , respectively. The action formula [A]e represents closure of A under stuttering
(with respect to e), in particular it is true of a pair of states 〈s, t〉 if A is true or if s = t .
Dually, 〈A〉e requires A to be true and the step from state s to state t to be observable through
a change of e . Finally, the state predicate ENABLED A is obtained by existential quantification
over all primed state variables that occur in the action A. For example,2
if A ∆= v > 0∧ v ′ = v −1∧w ′ = w
then ENABLED A ∆= ∃v ′,w ′ : v > 0∧ v ′ = v −1∧w ′ = w
It is easy to see that for this example, ENABLED A is logically equivalent to the predicate
v > 0. In general, ENABLED A is true at state s if there exists some state t such that A holds
for the pair 〈s, t〉.
Formulas at all three levels are closed under Boolean operators (¬, ∧, ∨,⇒, ≡) and first-
order quantifiers (∀, ∃). The rules for forming temporal formulas are as follows:
• Every state predicate is a temporal formula.
• If A is an action and e is a state formula then 2[A]e is a temporal formula.
• If ϕ is a temporal formula then so is 2ϕ.








STL2. 2ϕ ⇒ ϕ STL5. 2(ϕ∧ψ) ≡ 2ϕ∧2ψ
STL3. 22ϕ ≡ 2ϕ STL6. 32(ϕ∧ψ) ≡ 32ϕ∧32ψ
TLA1.
P ∧ e ′ = e ⇒ P ′
2P ≡ P ∧2[P ⇒ P ′]e
TLA2.
P ∧ [A]e ⇒ Q ∧ [B ]f
2P ∧2[A]e ⇒ 2Q ∧2[B ]f
Lattice.
(S ,≺) is a well-founded ordering
∀x ∈ S : ϕ(x ); (ψ∨∃y ∈ S : y ≺ x ∧ϕ(y))
(∃x ∈ S : ϕ(x )); ψ
Figure 1 Proof rules for simple TLA.
• If ϕ is a temporal formula, x is a constant, and v is a variable, then ∃x : ϕ and ∃v : ϕ are
temporal formulas.
The formulas 3ϕ and 3〈A〉e are shorthand for ¬2¬ϕ and ¬2[¬A]e , respectively. Also,
ϕ ; ψ (“ϕ leadsto ψ”) abbreviates 2(ϕ⇒ 3ψ). Observe in particular that if A is an action
formula, 2A is in general not well-formed: actions need to be “protected” by square or angle
brackets inside temporal formulas.
The operators 2 and 3 are the familar “always” and “eventually” operators of LTL: 2ϕ is
true of σ if ϕ is true of every suffix of σ. The formula 2[A]e is true of σ = 〈s0,s1, . . .〉 if, for
all n ∈N, the action A holds of the state pair 〈sn ,sn+1〉 or the state formula e evaluates to the
same value in sn and sn+1, and the interpretation of 3〈A〉e is dual. The syntactic restriction of
allowing action formulas to appear only inside brackets ensures that all temporal formulas ϕ
of TLA are insensitive to finite stuttering: if two state sequences σ and τ agree up to insertions
or removals of finite repetitions of states then ϕ is true of σ if and only if ϕ is true of τ. The
formula ∃v : ϕ is true of σ = 〈s0,s1, . . .〉 if ϕ is true of a sequence τ = 〈t0, t1, . . .〉 such that for
all n , sn and tn agree on the values of all variables except possible v . The formal definition is
somewhat more complicated in order to preserve invariance under stuttering [40].
The notion of validity of TLA formulas is standard. In particular, a temporal formula ϕ
is valid if it is true of all behaviors. Lamport also provides a set of proof rules for TLA.
In particular, he states that the proof rules reproduced in Figure 1, plus ordinary first-order
reasoning, are sufficient (in the sense of relative completeness [8]) for reasoning about
algorithms specified in TLA without quantification over state variables. These rules should
be read as asserting that if the hypotheses are valid, then so is the conclusion. For example,
rule (STL1) is the well-known necessitation rule of modal logic, and it is justified because any
suffix of a behavior is again a behavior, of which ϕ is true by the hypothesis of the rule. Of
course, the implication ϕ⇒2ϕ is not valid in general. From the elementary rules of Figure 1,
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further useful verification rules can be derived such as the following rule for proving that a
state predicate P is an invariant of a system specification
INV1.
P ∧ [A]e ⇒ P ′
P ∧2[A]e ⇒ 2P
This rule, like most other rules for system verification in TLA, establishes a conclusion ex-
pressed in temporal logic from non-temporal (action-level) hypotheses. In this way, reasoning
at the temporal level is confined to the top levels of a TLA proof and typically represents less
than 5% of the proof steps. In particular, reasoning about safety properties does not involve
temporal logic.
Lamport’s rules are intended for the verification of algorithms. In contrast, providing
a proof system for—even propositional—TLA that is complete in the standard sense of
formal logic (i.e., that allows all valid formulas to be derived as theorems) is more delicate.
In particular, whereas (INV1) is sufficient for proving invariants of systems, the general
induction axiom of LTL
2(ϕ⇒ cϕ) ⇒ (ϕ⇒2ϕ)
cannot be expressed in TLA because there is no next-time operator that could be applied to
temporal formulas. A generalization of TLA, together with a system of rules that is complete
for the propositional fragment of that logic, appears in [55].
2.3 Refinement, Hiding, and Composition
We mentioned above that TLA does not formally distinguish between system specifications
and their properties: both are represented as temporal formulas. In practice, specifications of
state machines are usually written in the form
Init∧2[Next ]v ∧L (1)
where the state predicate Init specifies the possible initial states of the system, the action
Next its next-state relation, v is the tuple of all state variables used in the specification, and
L expresses fairness conditions. Typically, Next is a disjunction of actions Ai that describe
atomic transitions of the system or of its environment, and L is a conjunction of strong or
weak fairness conditions on (some of) the actions Ai .
Refinement of specifications. Perhaps influenced by ideas on program refinement devel-
oped by Back and Morgan [11, 57], ultimately inspired by Dijkstra [18], Lamport [36] al-
ready observes that “temporal logic supports hierarchical specification and reasoning in a
simple, natural way”. He also notes that the essential ingredient for this to be possible is the
invariance of temporal logic formulas under stuttering, ensured by the absence of a next-time
operator. The idea is that a refinement R of a high-level specification S introduces implemen-
tation detail, represented by additional state variables. Newly introduced actions that modify
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solely these new variables correspond to stuttering steps at the level of S and, by stuttering
invariance, cannot invalidate S . Actions that modify the variables present in S must do so in
ways that are allowed by (the next-state relation of) S . Whereas R may have fewer behaviors
(when projected to the state space of S ), the fairness conditions in S must be preserved: if a
high-level action Ai for which S states a fairness condition is sufficiently often enabled in a
run, R must ensure that some action whose effect corresponds to the occurrence of Ai will
eventually occur in that run.
Summing up, R refines S if and only if the implication R⇒ S is valid. Assuming that R
and S are specified using formulas of shape (1) (with superscripts R and S ), refinement is
proved by finding a state predicate I such that all of the following implications hold:
InitR ⇒ I ∧ InitS
I ∧ [NextR ]vR ⇒ I ′∧ [NextS ]vS
2I ∧2[NextR ]vR ∧LR ⇒ LS
In words, I is an invariant of the low-level specification R that is strong enough to prove that
every transition according to R’s next-state relation is also a possible transition for S , possibly
stuttering, and to show that R implies the liveness hypotheses asserted by S . The first two
proof obligations establish the safety part of the refinement and do not involve temporal logic;
the third one concerns liveness and requires temporal reasoning.
Hiding of internal state. The standard form (1) of specifications is useful for describing a
system as a state machine, but it does not distinguish between variables that are visible at
the interface and those that represent the internal state of the machine. This distinction is,
however, important in the sense that the “contract” between the implementation of a system
and its users should only constrain the interface, not the internal state. For example, a high-
level specification Sset of a key-value store may represent the current content of the store in
a variable store holding a set of pairs (k ,v), but the implementer should be free to choose
another suitable data structure, such as a hashtable. Because the operations of the lower-
level specification Stbl update a hashtable instead of a set of pairs, the implication Stbl⇒ Sset
cannot be proved. Indeed, the internal variable store (and the set of values that it holds)
is not part of the interface of the system, which solely consists of the input and output
channels through which the system corresponds with its environment. Lamport realized that
this form of information hiding corresponds to existential quantification: the actual high-level
specification of our system is not Sset, but rather ∃store : Sset, which asserts that the system
behaves as if it contained a store represented as a set of key-value pairs. Similarly, the lower-









3 Of course, it is immaterial if the names of the bound variables in the two specifications are the same or not.
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where the internal state of the lower-level specification has been exposed. It now suffices to
find a suitable state function s that provides a witness term for the internal state of the higher-
level specification, i.e., such that the implication
Stbl ⇒ (Sset WITH store← s) (3)
is provable. (The notation used here for substituting the variable store by the expression s
is not part of TLA.) In our example, a suitable witness s is provided by the contents of the
hashtable.
State functions that serve as witness terms for refinement proofs are known as refinement
mappings. They serve to reconstruct the value of an internal state variable used in the
high-level specification from the corresponding lower-level state. Semantically, showing an
implication of the form (2) requires exhibiting an infinite sequence of values for the quantified
variable on the right-hand side, given a sequence of values for the variable on the left. In
contrast, a refinement mapping as in (3) computes values state by state, which is clearly
weaker: one cannot refer to previous or future values in the sequence of values satisfying
the left-hand specification. Indeed, in general a suitable refinement mapping need not exist
even if (2) holds. Abadi and Lamport [1] suggested that for the proof of refinement, the low-
level specification may be augmented by auxiliary variables. The augmented specification
is semantically equivalent to the original one, but the additional variables help in defining
a refinement mapping. In particular, Abadi and Lamport defined principles for augmenting
specifications by history and prophecy variables, and they provided sufficient conditions for
these principles to be complete for proving refinement. The constructions were presented in
a semantic framework independent of TLA. Proof rules for introducing auxiliary variables in
TLA appear in [49].
Representing parallel composition. The above discussion has shown that refinement and
hiding can be represented in TLA using implication and quantification, and therefore standard
principles of logical deduction can be applied to reason about these concepts. Now consider
two components, specified by TLA formulas Φ and Ψ, that are intended to operate in parallel.
In order for both parallel components to adhere to their specifications, the variables of the
first component must evolve as prescribed by Φ, and similarly for the second component. In
particular, any steps that change a variable shared by both components must be permitted by
both Φ and Ψ. Transitions that exclusively modify variables from one specification appear
as stuttering steps to the other one and are trivially allowed by that specification, whereas
variables shared between Φ and Ψ synchronize transitions of the two specifications. It follows
that the formula Φ∧Ψ characterizes the parallel composition of the two specifications. (We
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see in Section 3.3 that for some computational models, it may be useful to adopt a stronger
specification Φ∧Ψ∧Ξ where Ξ expresses extra synchronization hypotheses embodied in the
computational model.)
Expressing composition as conjunction corresponds to the overall philosophy of TLA
that structural concepts are expressed by logical operators. Although the conjunction of two
specifications Φ and Ψ written in the standard form of (1) is not itself in standard form, it can
easily be transformed into standard form by applying the equivalence
2[A]u ∧2[B ]v ≡ 2
[
[A]u ∧ [B ]v
]
〈u,v〉
Specifying open or closed systems. When specifying a component, one invariably has
to describe not just the component itself, but also the environment that the component
is going to operate in. A closed-system specification of a component describes the most
general environment that is acceptable, together with the component itself. In particular, the
specification’s next-state relation will be a disjunction of actions that describe the component’s
transitions and of actions that describe steps of the environment. Although this style works
well in practice, it does not yield the most general specification of the overall system.
Instead of constraining the environment, we may want to write a specification that allows the
environment to behave arbitrarily, but that leaves the behavior of the component unconstrained
after a step occurred that is disallowed by the assumptions on the environment. Abadi and
Lamport considered ways of writing specifications that separate the environment assumptions
E and the component guarantees C . The implication E ⇒ C is a natural way for expressing
such an assumption-guarantee specification, and this form is explored in [2]. However,
the implication holds of behaviors in which first the component violates C , and later the
environment violates E . In later work, Abadi and Lamport [3, 4] introduced the stronger
operator +−. such that E +−. C requires that (the safety part of) C may be violated only
if (the safety part of) E was violated strictly earlier.4 Given two components described
through assume-guarantee specifications, one may wish to prove that their composition refines
a higher-level specification of the composed system. This is expressed in TLA as a proof
obligation of the form
(E1
+−. C1)∧ (E2 +−. C2) ⇒ (E +−. C )
In order to establish the overall system guarantee C from the component guarantees C1 and
C2, one will need to show that the environment assumptions E1 and E2 hold true. Now, the
environment of each component consists of the overall environment (assumptions on which
are expressed by E ) and the other component, so one will want to use both E and C2 for
establishing E1, and similarly for the other component. Despite the apparent circularity of
this reasoning chain, Abadi and Lamport [4] give rules that support this approach in a sound
4 +−. can actually be expressed in TLA, but it is useful to consider it as a separate operator.
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way, based on a form of computational induction that is embodied in the definition of the +−.
operator.
3. The Specification Language TLA+
Lamport designed TLA as a variant of linear-time temporal logic that is particularly appropri-
ate for specifying executions of fair state machines. Stuttering invariance is key for represent-
ing composition as conjunction of specifications, and refinement as validity of implication.
Quantification over state variables adds significant expressive power and is useful notably for
distinguishing the state visible at the interface of a component from the internal state used for
its implementation.
However, TLA is not a full specification language: it does not fix the interpretation of
elementary function and predicate symbols such as + and ∈. These symbols are provided by
an underlying mathematical language based on first-order or higher-order logic. In particular,
non-temporal proof obligations that arise during the verification of a system property or during
a refinement proof should then be discharged using a (possibly mechanized) proof system
associated with that host language.
3.1 Overall Design of TLA+
Starting in the early 1990s and encouraged by successful experiments with TLP [21], a pro-
totype proof system for TLA based on the Larch Prover, Lamport developed the specification
language TLA+. The language is described in the book Specifying Systems [43]; the Hyper-
book and Lamport’s video series [46, 48] provide excellent tutorial introductions, whereas the
description of TLA+ in [56] focuses on the semantics of the language.
TLA+ is based on a variant of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC) for describ-
ing the data manipulated by an algorithm. ZFC is widely accepted by mathematicians as the
basis for formalizing mathematical theories. In order to emphasize the expressiveness of ZFC,
Lamport shows that a formal definition of the Riemann integral can be given in just 15 lines
starting from a standard module defining the real numbers with ordinary arithmetical oper-
ators [39]. When writing high-level specifications of algorithms, it is useful to model data
in terms of concepts such as sets and functions rather than using low-level data types pro-
vided by programming languages and their libraries. In this respect, TLA+ adopts a similar
approach as the specification languages Z and (Event-)B [5, 6, 64]. However, the latter lan-
guages impose a typing discipline on set theory, whereas TLA+ is untyped. Again, Lamport
follows classical mathematical practice and, for example, considers that the set {2,4,6, . . .}
of positive even numbers can be viewed as a type just like the set of all integers. He main-
tains that imposing a decidable type system on a specification language leads to unacceptable
restrictions of the expressiveness of that language. Also, embedding partial operations in a
typed language often leads to objectionable choices. For example, declaring integer division
as a binary operation with integer arguments and result asserts that division by 0 returns an in-
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teger, whereas implementations naturally raise an exception.5 Although TLA+ is untyped and
handles partial operators by underspecification [24], this does not preclude tools for TLA+
to reconstruct types when this is convenient for their analyses. An article by Lamport and
Paulson [50] contains an interesting discussion of these questions.
3.2 A Glimpse of TLA+
TLA+ specifications are organized in modules. A module can extend other modules; seman-
tically, this is equivalent to copying the content of the extended modules (with duplicates
removed) into the extending module.
A module may declare constant and variable parameters. Any symbol that occurs in an
expression in the module must be either a built-in symbol of TLA+, a parameter in the context
in which the expression appears, or a symbol that was previously defined or declared.
Modules may assert properties of constant parameters in the form of assumptions or
axioms, both of which express hypotheses of the module.6 Modules may also state theorems
that can be proved using TLAPS, the TLA+ Proof System.
The bulk of the contents of a typical TLA+ module consists of definitions of operators,
used to build up more complex expressions. An operator may take zero or more arguments,
including operator arguments (whose arity must be specified). For example, the definition
Symmetric(R( , ),S ) ∆= ∀x ,y ∈ S : R(x ,y)≡ R(y ,x )
introduces an operator characterizing a symmetric binary relation R over a set S . Besides
the ordinary operators of first-order set theory, TLA+ also borrows a few constructions from
programming languages, such as conditional expressions (including n-ary case distinctions)
and local definitions introduced through LET-bindings.
A module containing a system specification will usually define operators corresponding
to the initial condition, the next-state relation, the overall specification, and properties to be
verified. As a concrete example, Figure 2 contains a TLA+ specification of a FIFO queue. It
extends the library module Sequences, which defines the set Seq(S ) of finite sequences that
contain elements of S , as well as operations such as Head and Tail to access the first element
and the remaining elements of a sequence. Module FIFO then declares two constants Data and
null that correspond to the data to be stored in the queue and a “null” element representing
the absence of data. The module also declares the variables in, out, and q that are used for
specifying the state machine describing the behavior of the FIFO queue. Concretely, in and
out represent the channels for data input and output, whereas q contains the current contents
of the queue.
5 Some proof assistants such as Isabelle/HOL go even further and define n div 0 = 0, which is unlikely to hold in an
implementation and may actually mask errors.
6 TLC will verify that an assumption evaluates to true for the concrete values substituted for the module parameters,
but it will not evaluate axioms.




ASSUME null /∈ Data
VARIABLES in,q,out
TypeOK ∆= in ∈ (Data∪{null})∧ out ∈ (Data∪{null})∧ q ∈ Seq(Data)
Init ∆= in = null∧ out = null∧ q = 〈〉
Enq ∆= ∧ in′ ∈ (Data∪{null})\{in}
∧ q′ = IF in′ ∈ Data THEN Append(q, in′) ELSE q
∧ out′ = out
Deq ∆= ∧ ∨ q = 〈〉∧ out′ = null∧ q′ = q
∨ q 6= 〈〉∧ out′ = Head(q)∧ q′ = Tail(q)
∧ in′ = in
vars ∆= 〈in,q,out〉
FIFO ∆= Init∧ 2[Enq∨ Deq ]vars∧WFvars(Deq)
THEOREM FIFOType ∆= FIFO ⇒ 2TypeOK
THEOREM InOut ∆= FIFO ⇒ 2[ in′ = in∨ out′ = out ]vars
THEOREM Liveness ∆= FIFO ⇒ ∀x ∈ Data : (in = x ); (out = x )
Figure 2 TLA+ specification of a FIFO queue.
Again, TLA+ is untyped, and consequently one does not declare types for constant or
variable parameters. Because TLA+ is based on set theory, there is no need to assert that Data
is a set. In fact, semantically all values are sets, although it is more useful to think of the
elements of set Data∪{null}, as well as of numbers or strings, as atomic values.
The second block of the module contains operator definitions.7 The first operator corre-
sponds to the (intended) type invariant of the specification. The definitions of the operators
Init, Enq, and Deq introduce the initial condition and the enqueue and dequeue actions of
the queue. The initial predicate simply requires that the input and output channels contain
the null value and that the queue is empty. The enqueue action models a change of value at
the input channel. If a data value is sent over the channel, it is appended to the current con-
tents of the queue. Otherwise (i.e., if a null value appears on the channel), the queue remains
unchanged. The output value of the queue remains unchanged during an enqueue operation.





ASSUME null /∈ Data
VARIABLES in,q1,mid,q2,out
Left ∆= INSTANCE FIFO WITH q← q1,out← mid
Right ∆= INSTANCE FIFO WITH in← mid,q← q2
Conc ∆= INSTANCE FIFO WITH q← q2◦q1
Interleave ∆= in′ = in∨ out′ = out
TwoFIFO ∆= Left!FIFO∧ Right!FIFO∧ 2[Interleave]in,out
THEOREM Implementation ∆= TwoFIFO ⇒ Conc!FIFO
Figure 3 Composition of two FIFO queues.
Symmetrically, a dequeue operation does not modify the input channel. It puts null on the
output channel and leaves the queue unchanged if the queue is empty and otherwise sends
Head(q) on the output channel and removes that element from the queue. Formula FIFO rep-
resents the overall queue specification. Its next-state relation is the disjunction of the enqueue
and dequeue actions. The fairness conjunct requires dequeue actions to happen eventually so
that the queue must eventually output the values that it stores.
The third block of the module asserts three theorems. The first theorem states that the
type correctness predicate holds throughout any execution. The second theorem states that the
values of the input and output channels never change simultaneously, and the third theorem
asserts that every data value that appears on the input channel will eventually be output by the
queue. We will see in Section 5 how these properties can be verified using the TLA+ tools.
3.3 Composing Modules
Beyond module extension, TLA+ offers instantiation as a second way for composing modules.
An instance conceptually creates a copy of the original module in which the constant and
variable parameters can be instantiated by (constant and state) expressions. This construction
is useful for composing specifications. For example, module TwoFIFO of Figure 3 declares the
composition of two FIFO queues by creating two instances Left and Right of the FIFO module
of Figure 2. Instance Left uses variables q1 and mid for the internal queue and the output
channel; all other parameters are instantiated by the parameters of the same name declared in
module TwoFIFO. Similarly, instance Right uses mid and q2 for in and q. The conjunction
of the two instantiated specifications Left!FIFO and Right!FIFO describes the composition
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of two FIFO queues that communicate through the shared communication channel mid. We
would like to assert that the conjunction of these specifications behaves like a FIFO whose
internal queue is given by the concatenation of the internal queues of the two components. The
instance Conc represents this “longer” FIFO queue with input channel in and output channel
out, and we would therefore like to assert the theorem
Left!FIFO∧ Right!FIFO⇒ Conc!FIFO.
However, this implication is not valid: the conjunction on the left-hand side allows an enqueue
action of the left FIFO queue and a dequeue action of the right FIFO queue to happen
simultaneously (observe that both actions leave the shared variable mid unchanged). In this
case, the values of the channels in and out change simultaneously, and this is not allowed by
specification Conc!FIFO. Indeed, we wrote our specification according to an interleaving
model, where enqueue and dequeue actions do not happen simultaneously. We have to
explicitly enforce this interleaving assumption for the composition of the two FIFO queues, as
expressed in the specification TwoFIFO, in order to obtain the theorem Implementation stated
at the end of the module.
4. PlusCal: an Algorithm Language
Due to its expressiveness and high level of abstraction, TLA+ is a very powerful language
for specifying high-level designs of concurrent algorithms and systems. However, it may feel
unfamiliar to programmers, in particular due to the syntax based on mathematical logic and
to the absence of explicit control flow in the specification of systems and algorithms. Lamport
designed PlusCal [44] as a language for describing algorithms that combines the look and feel
of pseudo-code and the precision of TLA+. It uses primitives that are familiar from imperative
programming languages for describing the control flow of an algorithm. In contrast, the
data manipulated by the algorithm is represented by TLA+ expressions, letting the algorithm
designer benefit from the abstraction afforded by set theory without being constrained by
concerns of how to concretely implement data structures.
A PlusCal algorithm is embedded as a comment within a TLA+ module and has access
to all operators available at that point of the module (whether defined in extended modules
or locally). The PlusCal translator converts the algorithm into a TLA+ specification that is
inserted into the module. The user then states properties in terms of the TLA+ translation and
verifies them just as for any other TLA+ specification, using the tools described in Section 5.
A PlusCal algorithm may declare several process templates for parallel execution, and
each template can have a fixed number of instances.8 Variables can be declared globally,
representing shared state (including the communication network of a distributed system),
or locally for each process. The control flow of each process is described using standard
8 PlusCal does not support dynamic spawning of processes.
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primitives of imperative languages (sequencing, conditional statements, loops, procedure calls
etc.). In addition, the two primitives
either { . . . }
or { . . . }
and with (x ∈ S ) { . . . }
are available for modeling non-determinism. The first construct can be used to introduce a
fixed number of alternatives, the second one executes a block of code for some value that is
chosen non-deterministically from the set S . Synchronization among processes is modeled
using the instruction await P that blocks until the predicate P becomes true.
An important aspect for the specification of concurrent algorithms is to identify the “grain
of atomicity”, i.e., which blocks of statements are intended to be executed without interference
from other processes. Rather than imposing an arbitrary fixed level of atomicity, PlusCal uses
labels to identify yield points at which processes may be interrupted. A group of statements
between two labels is assumed to be executed atomically. This allows the designer to choose
the degree of atomicity appropriate for the specification and to compare algorithms described
at different degrees of atomicity.9 In order to ensure liveness of PlusCal algorithms, fairness
conditions may be attached to labels or to entire processes. These ensure that the group of
statements following the label (respectively, the entire process) will eventually execute if it is
sufficiently often enabled.
As an example, a PlusCal algorithm modeling a simple producer-consumer system appears
in Figure 4. It declares two process templates for the producer and the consumer, each of
which is instantiated once for process identities “p” and “c”. The two processes communicate
using a shared FIFO queue of bounded capacity maxCapacity. Each process has an infinite
loop: the producer repeatedly adds new data to the queue, while the consumer retrieves the
data from the queue. By declaring a (weak) fairness condition for the consumer process, we
ensure that every data item that is present in the queue will eventually be consumed. In this
specification of the algorithm, the bodies of the while loops execute atomically; non-atomic
execution would be modeled by inserting additional labels. The operations Len, Append,
Head, and Tail that appear in the presentation of the algorithm are defined in the standard
module Sequences that is extended by module ProducerConsumer.
Invoking the PlusCal translator on module ProducerConsumer generates a TLA+ specifi-
cation corresponding to the algorithm. In particular, the translator generates declarations of
TLA+ variables corresponding to the global and local variables of the PlusCal algorithm, and
it derives the initial condition from the initializations of the PlusCal variables.10 The essen-
tial step of the translation is to generate a TLA+ action for each group of statements between
9 Some rules govern where labels must or cannot be placed, essentially to ensure that PlusCal algorithms are easy to
translate into TLA+ specifications.
10 For PlusCal variables that are not initialized, such as rcvd in our example, the translator adds a default initialization,
which is necessary for model checking using TLC.




ASSUME maxCapacity ∈ Nat \{0}
(*
– algorithm ProducerConsumer {
variable q = 〈〉;
define {
nonempty ∆= Len(q)> 0
nonfull ∆= Len(q)< maxCapacity
}
process (Producer = “p”) {
p : while (TRUE) {
await nonfull;
with (item ∈ Data) {
q := Append(q, item)
} } }
fair process (Consumer = “c”)
variable rcvd; {







Figure 4 A specification of a producer-consumer system in PlusCal.
two consecutive labels. For example, the loop body of the producer process of Figure 4 is




∧ ∃item ∈ Data : q′ = Append(q, item)
∧ rcvd′ = rcvd
For more complicated algorithms, the translator adds a variable pc that represents the current
point of control of each process. When a process type has several instances, their local
variables are represented using arrays (i.e., TLA+ functions).
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Because the translation from PlusCal to TLA+ is fairly direct, the generated TLA+ speci-
fication is usually quite readable. This is important because correctness properties of the al-
gorithm are written in TLA+ rather than in PlusCal. For our producer-consumer example, we
may want to verify the invariant BoundedQueue and the temporal property Liveness defined
as
BoundedQueue ∆= q ∈ Seq(Data)∧ Len(q)≤ maxCapacity
Liveness ∆= ∀d ∈ Data : (∃i ∈ 1 ..Len(q) : q[i ] = d) ; rcvd = d
that express type correctness and eventual reception of every data item contained in the queue.
5. Tool Support
5.1 The model checker TLC
Lamport originally designed TLA+ as a precise and expressive language for specifying
algorithms and for (deductively) reasoning about their properties. It was used in the second
half of the 1990s by hardware designers at Digital Equipment Corporation, in particular for
describing cache coherence protocols of multiprocessors [30]. They wrote rigorous, informal
proofs for key invariants maintained by these protocols. Yuan Yu then recognized that it
was possible to support this type of reasoning using model checking. Lamport reports that
originally he was very skeptical of this idea. Input languages for model checkers such as
Spin [28], SMV [54] or Murphi [19] are based on low-level primitives carefully chosen to
support efficient verification of finite-state systems, whereas TLA+ uses the full power of
ZFC set theory and is intended for modeling systems of arbitrary size. It is not possible in
general to systematically enumerate all behaviors that satisfy a given TLA+ formula.
TLC, the TLA+ model checker, accepts a subset of TLA+ specifications written in standard
form (1). It is an explicit-state model checker, intended for verifying finite instances of
specifications. In addition to the specification, the user has to provide the model checker with a
model that describes a finite instance by fixing specific values for constant parameters. For the
queue specification of Figure 2, one could for example fix parameter values Data = {1,2,3}
and null = 0. TLC then interprets the specification, restricted to this model, by decomposing
the next-state relation into disjuncts (bounded existential quantification over finite sets is
expanded into an explicit disjunction) and evaluating each disjunct from left to right. The
first occurrence of a primed variable v ′ is expected to be of the form v ′ = e or v ′ ∈ e for an
expression e that TLC can evaluate; in the second form, e must evaluate to a finite set. The
first form is interpreted as an assignment of (the value denoted by) e to v in the successor
state. The second form leads to the generation of one successor state per element of e , with v
assigned to that element. Subsequent occurrences of v ′ are interpreted by the value assigned
to v in the successor state in this way. For example, the conjunct
in′ ∈ (Data∪{null})\{in}
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of the action Enq of Figure 2 generates one successor state for each element of Data∪{null},
except for the current value of in. The occurrences of in′ in the second conjunct of Enq then
refer to the value chosen for that successor state. The initial predicate is evaluated in a similar
way. TLC will abort with an error message if the initial predicate or some subaction of the
next-state relation does not assign a value to some of the variables declared in the module.
When evaluating set-theoretic expressions, TLC will generally enumerate the elements, but
it will apply some optimizations. For example, in evaluating the predicate e ∈ Nat that may
occur in a typing invariant, TLC will simply check if (the value denoted by) e is a natural
number. TLC disallows unbounded quantification, and it signals an error when it would have
to enumerate an infinite set.
Using the strategy outlined above, TLC enumerates all reachable states in a breadth-first
manner, and it checks the invariant predicates provided by the user during this state enumer-
ation. When an invariant evaluates to false, the run is aborted and a counter-example is dis-
played. (Due to breadth-first search, that counter-example will be of minimal length.) Liveness
properties are evaluated over the state graph computed during state enumeration, based on the
tableau algorithm of [53]. TLC parallelizes state enumeration on multi-core machines and pro-
vides a distributed implementation for running in a cluster or cloud environment. States may
be stored to disk so that state exploration is not memory bound, and TLC regularly performs
checkpoints so that model checking can be resumed in case of a crash. In order to limit the
explored state space, the user can impose state constraints. For example, the FIFO queue of
Figure 2 generates an unbounded state space even for a fixed finite set Data because the length
of the queue can grow without bound, and the user can choose not to explore successors of
states in which Len(q) exceeds some fixed value. TLC also implements symmetry reduction
in order to explore only a quotient of the state space with respect to an equivalence relation.
In the queue example, the user may choose to declare Data (or more precisely, the set that
the parameter Data is instantiated with in the concrete model) as a symmetry set because all
operations are insensitive to particular values in that set.
Although TLC imposes certain restrictions on the specifications that it can check, most
specifications that are written in practice adhere to those restrictions or can easily be rewritten
so that they do. (The fact that TLC has been the main analysis tool for TLA+ specifications
has also contributed to disciplining users so that they respect those restrictions.) In particular,
TLA+ specifications obtained from translating PlusCal algorithms can be checked using TLC.
The different properties asserted in the modules of the previous sections can be verified by
TLC for concrete instances of parameters, including the theorems of Figures 2 and 3, as well
as the properties of the producer-consumer system given at the end of Section 4.11
Like most model checkers, TLC is most useful when a counter-example to a putative
property is discovered. A positive verdict only means that the checked properties hold for the
11 The specification TwoFIFO of Figure 3 needs to be rewritten in standard form so that TLC can verify it.
20
particular model that TLC checked, and it requires sound engineering judgement to determine
if this gives enough confidence in the correctness of the properties for arbitrary instances of
the specification.
5.2 The TLA+ Proof System
TLAPS, the TLA+ Proof System [17], is a proof assistant for checking proofs written in TLA+.
For this purpose, TLA+ was extended to include a language for writing hierarchical proofs
based on a format that Lamport had proposed earlier [41] for writing rigorous pencil-and-
paper proofs. For example, the proof of type correctness for the FIFO queue of Figure 2 can
be written as follows.
THEOREM FIFOType ∆= FIFO ⇒ 2TypeOK
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ TypeOK
BY DEF Init,TypeOK
〈1〉2. TypeOK∧ [Enq∨ Deq ]vars ⇒ TypeOK′
BY DEF Enq,Deq,vars,TypeOK
〈1〉3. QED
BY 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTL DEF FIFO
Following a standard pattern for invariance proofs (cf. also rule INV1 of Section 2.2),
the first two steps of the proof establish that the initial predicate of the FIFO specification
implies predicate TypeOK, and that the predicate is preserved by every step allowed by the
next-state relation. The third step concludes the proof of the theorem. The justifications for
each step are indicated following the keyword BY. For the first two steps, it suffices to expand
the relevant definitions and then apply built-in automatic proof back-ends that mechanize
standard mathematical reasoning. The justification of the third step uses the assertions of the
two preceding steps and propositional temporal logic; it also expands the definition of FIFO
in order to expose its initial and next-state predicates. Because the proof is so simple, we only
needed one level of proof: all step names have the form 〈1〉n . The steps of more complicated
proofs can be decomposed into lower-level proof steps until TLAPS can prove the leaf steps
of the proof automatically.
Figure 5 schematizes the architecture of TLAPS. The central component is the proof
manager that interprets the proof language, maintains the context of each proof step (i.e.,
the visible identifiers, assumptions, and definitions) and computes the corresponding proof
obligations. In a non-temporal step (such as the first two steps in the above example), primes
are pushed inside complex expressions, and then primed symbols are replaced by fresh
identifiers. Similarly, any temporal expressions appearing in the context are abstracted by
fresh predicate symbols. Similarly, in a temporal step (such as the QED step above), any
first-order formulas are abstracted by propositional variables. This transformation is called
coalescing [20]; it is necessary so that back-end provers see the proof obligation either as
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Figure 5 Architecture of the TLA+ Proof System.
a standard formula of mathematical set theory or as a propositional temporal logic formula.
The proof manager then calls back-end provers to attempt and prove the proof obligation.
Currently, TLAPS supports SMT solvers (via a translation to the SMT-LIB2 language [12]),
the tableau prover Zenon [14], and an encoding of TLA+’s mathematical set theory as an
object logic in the logical framework Isabelle [60] for proving non-temporal steps. It also
comes with a decision procedure for propositional temporal logic [65] for proving temporal
proof obligations. The architecture is open for supporting additional back-end provers through
suitable translations of proof obligations into their input language. For increased confidence
in the correctness of TLAPS proofs, when a back-end prover finds a proof it may return
a justification to the proof manager for checking by the trusted kernel of Isabelle. This
certification step is optional and currently only available for proofs found by Zenon.
TLAPS is currently restricted to proving safety properties. The planned extension to liveness
properties requires support for handling ENABLED predicates and for first-order temporal
logic reasoning, for example for mechanizing the Lattice rule of Section 2.2. TLAPS has been
used for verifying several distributed algorithms, including variants of Paxos [16, 45] and a
version of the Pastry distributed hash table [10].
5.3 The TLA+ Toolbox
Editing and analyzing TLA+ specifications is facilitated by the TLA+ Toolbox, an Eclipse
application that provides an IDE (integrated development environment) for TLA+. It provides
support for editing TLA+ specifications and proofs, such as looking up operator definitions,
properly indenting TLA+ specifications, renumbering proof steps, and hiding subproofs that
are irrelevant for the current branch. The Toolbox is integrated with the TLA+ tools, including
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SANY, the TLA+ syntactic and semantic analyzer, the TLATEX pretty printer, TLC and TLAPS.
In particular, the user interface to TLC provided by the Toolbox greatly simplifies the definition
of finite-state models to be verified, the analysis of counter-examples, and the evaluation of
TLA+ expressions.
All TLA+ tools are released as open-source software under permissive licences for use in
industry or academia.
6. Impact
The concepts that Lamport introduced for the formal specification and verification of algo-
rithms have deeply influenced the research community. The notions of safety, liveness, and
fairness are universally recognized for their fundamental importance. The concept of stutter-
ing invariance is valuable in contexts other than those strictly related to refinement and com-
position; in particular, it plays an important role for partial-order reductions used for model
checking distributed systems [23, 66]. The idea of writing system specifications in terms of
state machines is widely accepted [6, 25]. The specification language TLA+ is taught at uni-
versities around the world, and PlusCal is starting to be used as a vehicle for teaching courses
on distributed algorithms.
The historically first significant use of TLA+ in industry was for specifying and verifying
cache coherence protocols by a group of hardware engineers that designed Digital Equip-
ment Corporation’s Alpha processors [30]. Members of that group subsequently moved to
Intel and continued to use TLA+, although little is publicly known about the impact of that
work. Work at Microsoft using TLA+ started around 2003 with the specification of the Web
Services Atomic Transaction protocol [29]. This experience was considered successful, and
engineers at Microsoft continued to use TLA+. Reportedly, use of TLA+ contributed to identi-
fying a serious error in the XBox 360 memory system that would have been difficult to debug
using conventional techniques. The Farsite project [13] at Microsoft Research developed a
scalable, serverless, and location-transparent distributed file system that could tolerate nodes
being unavailable, as well as malicious participants. The designers used TLA+ for specifying
the distributed directory service and refined a centralized functional specification into the for-
mal description of a distributed protocol. They report that the main benefit of using formal
specification and verification was to understand the invariants that the system must maintain
through different levels of refinement. They consider that it would have been far more costly
to iterate through several designs at the implementation level where aspects related to the
distributed protocol would have been mixed with low-level coding details. In contrast, they
found that developing an implementation from the protocol specification was rather straight-
forward because only sequential code had to be written, without a need for thinking about
aspects related to distributed execution. In the later IronFleet project [26, 27], researchers at
Microsoft pushed this idea even further. Combining a TLA-style approach to state machine
specification and refinement with a Floyd-Hoare style of reasoning about imperative programs
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provided by Dafny [52], they obtained a mechanized framework for designing, implementing,
and verifying distributed systems from high-level (centralized) specifications to distributed
protocols and further to executable code that exhibited competitive performance. Based on an
embedding of TLA and its proof rules in Dafny, they could prove not only safety, but even
liveness properties in a unified framework. The approach was used to develop a replicated
state machine library and a sharded key-value store.
An interesting account of the use of TLA+ in industry was provided by a group around
Chris Newcombe working at Amazon Web Services [58]. They reported that not only have
TLA+ specifications contributed to finding subtle bugs in high-level designs of distributed
protocols, but that the understanding and confidence obtained from formal specification and
verification allowed them to make aggressive performance optimizations without sacrificing
correctness. Several other companies developing web and cloud services, including the groups
working on Azure at Microsoft, actively use TLA+ and TLC for describing and verifying the
protocols they design. The TLA+ Google group12 and regular in-person community meetings
provide forums for the members of the TLA+ community to exchange and help each other in
case of problems.
TLA+ is intended as a formalism for modeling and verifying high-level designs of algo-
rithms and systems. Doing so does not prevent coding errors from creeping into implemen-
tations of verified algorithms: such errors can be caught using techniques of program verifi-
cation. However, the implementation of a buggy design is virtually guaranteed to contain the
design errors, and finding and fixing these issues at the level of executable code is much more
difficult and costly than to do so at an early stage of development, using specifications written
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